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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Liability of the Manufacturer to the Ultimate
Consumer for Breach of Warranty in Ohio
I. INTRODUCTION
The landmark case establishing the manufacturer's liability to the ulti-
mate consumer for negligence is MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.' Both
state and federal courts in Ohio have followed that decision.2
The next logical step would seem to be to allow the ultimate con-
sumer to recover from the manufacturer in a breach of warranty action,
but the requirement of privity has, for the most part, prevented the courts
from taking this step.3 Originally breach of warranty was an action on
the case and sounded in tort rather than in contract,4 and accordingly
there was no requirement of privity. Later the method of declaring on a
warrant in indeb;tatus assumpst arose and the tort elements of the action
were lost.5 Breach of warranty came to be considered a part of the con-
tract, and since the manufacturer had no contract with the subpurchaser,
there was no privity and hence, no liability in warranty.6
1217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) "On its face the decision purported merely
to extend the class of 'inherently dangerous' articles to include anything which would
be dangerous if negligently made. But its reasoning and its fundamental philosophy
was clearly that the manufacturer, by placing the car upon the market, assumed a
responsibility to the consumer, resting not upon contract but upon the relation aris-
ing from his purchase and the foreseeability of harm if proper care were not used."
PROSSER, TORTS 677 (1941).
'White Sewing Machine Co. v. Feisel, 28 Ohio App. 152, 162 N.E. 633 (1927);
O'Donnell v. Geneva Metal Wheel Co., 183 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1950) No privity
is required in Ohio in a negligence action by a third person against the furnisher or
supplier of an article when it is contemplated that the third person will use the article
and may be injured by any hazard involved in such use. Witherspoon v. Haft, 157
Ohio St. 474, 106 N.E.2d 296 (1952)
'Considerations of policy have also proved a deterrent in this field, for the author-
ities have questioned the fairness of making the manufacturer an insurer of his
product. See WILLISTON, SALES 5 244 (3d ed. 1948) High responsibility has
historically been placed on the seller of food, however, and there is today a strong
tendency to impose strict liability on the manufacturer under a breach of warranty
theory in the food and beverage cases. See Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189
Iowa 775, 176 N.W 382 (1920); Patargias v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 332 111.
App. 117, 74 N.E.2d 162 (1947); Parks v. C. C. Yost Pie Co., 93 Kan. 334, 144
Pac. 202 (1914); Helms v. General Baking Co., 164 S.W.2d 150 (Mo. App.
1942); Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928);
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fort Worth v. Burgess, 195 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. 1946)
'Ames, History of Assumpst, 2 HARv. L. REy. 1, 8 (1888); WILLISTON SALES §
195 (3d ed. 1948)
'Jeanblanc, Manufacturers' Liability to Persons Other Than Thesr Immediate Ven-
dees, 24 VA. L. REV. 134, 149 (1937).
'See for instance: Paull v. McBride, 273 Mich. 661, 263 N.W 877 (1935); Wood
v. Advance Rumely Thresher Co., 60 N.D. 384, 234 N.W 517 (1931); Turner v.
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In order to avoid this technical rule, some courts have found the
manufacturer liable by holding that no privity is required in the manu-
facturer-ultimate consumer cases. 7 Others have said that a warranty
arises by operation of law and out of public policy." Again, when the
manufacturer accompanies his product with a descriptive manual, it has
been held that there is an express warranty within Section 12 of the Umn-
form Sales Act.9 Still other courts have found privity, and therefore,
liability, by indulging in various legal fictions.' 0
II. OHIO
A. Personal Injuries-Food Cases
Apparently the first case in Ohio involving the question of implied
warranty between the manufacturer and the ultimate consumer was an
action for personal injuries, Ward Baking Co. v. Trtzzno."l In this case
the plaintiff purchased from a retailer a cake made by defendant. Upon
eating the cake, plaintiff was injured by an imbedded needle. The peti-
Edison Storage Battery Co., 248 N.Y. 73, 161 N.E. 423 (1928); J. I. Case Thresh-
ing Machine Co. v. Dulworth, 216 Ky. 637, 287 S.W 994 (1926); Welshausen v.
Charles Parker Co. 83 Conn. 231, 76 Adt. 271 (1910)
'Mannsz v. MacWhyte, 155 F.2d 445, 449-450 (3rd Cir. 1946) -" the re-
quirement of privity between the injured party and the manufacturer of the artide
which has injured hun has been obliterated from Pennsylvania law." (On other
grounds, however, plaintiff was denied recovery); Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co.,
154 Fla. 872, 19 So.2d 313 (1944); Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317
(1953).
'Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Burgess, 195 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. 1946); Jacob E. Decker
& Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
9Mannsz v. MacWhyte, 155 F.2d 445 (3rd Cir. 1946) (On other grounds, how-
ever, plaintiff was denied recovery) It is doubtful though that many jurisdictions
will apply Section 12 (OHIo REV. CODE § 1315.13) beyond the two-party or re-
tailer-ultimate consumer situation. See for instance: Jordan v. Brouwer, 86 Ohio
App. 505, 93 N.E.2d 49 (1949)
" Hertzler v. Manshum, 228 Mich. 416, 200 N.W 155 (1924) (The manufacturer
owes a duty to the consuming public); Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., Ltd., 14 Cal.
2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939), and Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss.
876, 111 So. 305 (1927) (Privity runs with a chattel just as a covenant runs with
land); Ward Baking Company v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557
(1928) (These are third party beneficiary contracts, the middleman making the
contract with the manufacturer for the benefit of the ultimate consumer); Madouras
v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90 S.W.2d 445 (1936)
(Since the middleman could have brought an action against the manufacturer, he
merely assigns his right to the ultimate consumer); Roberts v. Anheuser-Busch
Assoc., 211 Mass. 449, 98 N.E. 95 (1912) (The manufacturer has made representa-
tions to the public at large, and any consumer is entitled to rely upon them); Tim-
berland Lumber Co. v. Climax Mfg. Co., 61 F.2d 391 (3d Cit. 1932) (The manu-
facturer authorizes the dealer as his agent to make representations).
"27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928)
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tion alleged both breach of warranty and negligence,12 but the court of
appeals, in affirming a judgment for plaintiff, held that it was not neces-
sary to resort to res tpsa loqutur and that plaintiff could recover for
breach of warranty under a third party beneficiary theory-18
The Baking Company, when it delivered the cake in question to the
groceryman, to say the least, impliedly represented to the public, who is
the ultimate consumer, that this cake: is free from injurious substances and
fit for consumption as food. There is no doubt that an implied warranty
arises between the groceryman who purchased the cake and the Baking
Company. Since the Baking Company was fully aware that the grocery-
man did not purchase the cake for his own consumption, but purchased the
same for the purpose of selling the same to members of the public, who
are the ultimate consumers, this implied obligation which unquestionably
arose in favor of the groceryman may be legally said to have also arisen
for the benefit of the consumer. The groceryman, who is in effect merely
a distributing medium for the articles of food furnished by the Baking
Company, and the Baking Company having full knowledge of that fact
dealt with each other and entered into a contractual relationship for the
benefit of the public which is the ultimate consumer.'
The court went on to say-
we are content to place ourselves in the category of the minority
states, if such be the case, and to hold that there is imposed the absolute
liability of a warrantor on the manufacturer of artides of food in favor
of the ultimate purchaser, even though there are no direct contractual rela-
tionships between such ultimate purchaser and the manufacturer.
The strong language of the Ward case is somewhat weakened by the
holdings in Canton Prowszon Co. v. Gauder'6 and Kniess v. Armour &
Co.,x7 both of which were actions for personal injuries sustained from the
sale of unwholesome food. The decisive principle of both cases was that
the consumer could not join the manufacturer and the retailer in a single
action. However, dicta in the two cases as to the warranty problem were
entirely contradictory. The Gauder court said that there was no implied
warranty between the consumer and the manufacturer since there was no
meeting of the minds, and the Knzess court asserted that public policy de-
"There is the obligation that the goods will be fit for the particular purpose in-
tended and the further duty to refrain from including therein any hidden danger
unknown to the buyer. Failure to meet the first obligation is a breach of warranty,
express or implied; failure to meet the second duty is negligence." Sicard v. Kremer,
133 Ohio St. 291, 294, 13 N.E.2d 250, 252 (1938)
This theory may, perhaps, be supported on the ground that the third party bene-
ficiary of a contract need not be in being at the time of the making of the contract.
RESTATEMENT, CoNTRAcTs § 139 (1932)
"Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 481, 161 N.E.557, 559 (1928)
' Id. at 482, 161 N.E. at 559.
" 130 Ohio St. 43, 196 N.E. 634 (1935), reversing Gauder v. Canton Provision Co.,
56 Ohio App. 170, 10 N.E.2d 163 (1937)
"'134 Ohio St. 432, 17 N.E.2d 734 (1938).
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manded that the manufacturer should warrant to the public generally
that its food products were fit for human consumption.
B. Personal Injurses-Products Other Than Food
Whether the doctrine of the Ward case should be limited to actions
for personal injuries received from the consumption of unwholesome food
is apparently undecided in Ohio. Dow Drug Co. v. Nieman'8 was an
action against a distributor and a retailer for personal injuries sustained
from an exploding cigar. The court of appeals said that there was evi-
dence of negligence, and that since the case had been submitted to the
jury on both negligence and breach of warranty, and the jury had found
against the plaintiff as to the distributor, there was no prejudice. The
court thus made no dear cut decision as to the applicability of the breach
of warranty theory.19
In Kruper v. Proctor & Gamble Co.2 O the plaintiff brought an action
against a soap manufacturer for injuries sustained from a piece of wire
inbedded in a bar of soap which plaintiff purchased from a retailer.
From a judgment for the plaintiff, defendant appealed to the Court of
Appeals for Cuyahoga County. In holding that there was a breach of
implied warranty, the court, citing the Ward case, said: "The question
of privity should not protect one who sells unmerchantable goods when
an inspection will not disclose the defect."
2
'
"57 Ohio App. 190, 13 N.E.2d 130 (1936).
"After noting that since the distributor marketed the cigars as its own, whatever
negligence was attributable to the original manufacturer was also attributable to it,
the court said at page 201. 'That there is a liability upon a negligent manufacturer
who sells articles knowing they are intended for resale to sub-purchasers is clear
from the trend of modern authorities. The only controversy is as to the basis of
liability, some holding that the implied warranties are made for the benefit of the
sub-purchasers and form the basis of liability, and others holding that there must be
proof of negligence to impose a liability." [citing Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino,
27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928); White Sewing Machine Co. v. Feisel, 28
Ohio App. 152, 162 N.E. 633 (1927); and MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217
N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).] Other Ohio cases which indicate that the
manufacturer could be liable for personal injuries resulting from products other
than food are Sicard v. Kremer, 133 Ohio St. 291, 13 N.E.2d 250 (1938), and
DiVello v. Gardner Machine Co., 102 N.E.2d 289 (Cuyaloga Com. Pl. 1951). In
the Sicard case, the court said that the manufacturer might be liable for personal in-
juries caused by a hair dye since the product could not be used for the purpose in-
tended or represented. In that case, though, plaintiff purchased the hair dye from
defendant's agent rather than from a retailer; thus, there was perhaps privity. In
the DiVello case, the manufacturer was held liable for breach of warranty when a
grinding wheel disintegrated, killing plaintiff's decedent, who was an employee of
one who had purchased the wheel directly from the manufacturer.
' 113 N.E.2d 605 (Ohio App. 1953).
'Kruper v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 113 N.E.2d 605, 608 (Ohio App. 1953).
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The court of appeals certified the record to the Ohio Supreme Court
on the ground that the decision was in conflict with that of the Court of
Appeals for Mahoning County on the same question.22  When the su-
preme court reviewed the case, it found that the trial court had not
charged the jury on the subject of implied warranty, that such a charge
had not been requested, and that this question was, therefore, not even
before the court. The supreme court held also that res ipsa loquitur was
not applicable because the instrumentality was not under defendant's ex-
dusive management and control and reversed the court of appeals.23
C. Property Damage
Apparently the first case in Ohio of an ultimate consumer against a
manufacturer for breach of warranty resulting in property damage was
Jordan v. Brouwer.24 In that case the plaintiff brought an action to re-
cover for damages to his automobile allegedly resulting from the use of
anti-freeze manufactured and distributed by defendant. In reversing a
judgment for plaintiff, the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County held
that there was no privity between plaintiff and defendant, and that such
privity is necessary to sustain an action based upon breach of warranty.
The court in this case drew a distinction between property damage and
personal injury saying, " there are exceptions to the rule of privity,
where injury results to the person of plaintiff. '25
W/ood v. General Electrzc Co.,26 was an action to recover for property
damage allegedly resulting from a defective electric blanket purchased by
plaintiff in the original package from an intermediate dealer. The peti-
tion stated two causes of action- one for negligence and one for breach
of warranty. The jury returned a general verdict for the defendant manu-
'Male v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 14 Ohio L. Abs. 119 (Ohio App. 1932) This case
was based on the theory that a manufacturer is liable for injuries sustained by a
purchaser from a retailer only when he produces an article which he knows is inher-
ently dangerous to life or health, or when in the manufacture of the artide he uses
ingredients which are to his knowledge inherently dangerous to life and health.
This case did not discuss breach of warranty but was based on a negligence theory.
It is apparent that the Male case represents a refusal to accept the general judicial
interpretation of the MacPherson doctrine, i.e., that a manufacturer can be liable to
the ultimate consumer for the manufacturer's own negligence, even though the arti-
de in question is not inherently dangerous.
u160 Ohio St. 489, 117 N.E.2d 7 (1954)
2486 Ohio App. 505, 93 N.E.2d 49 (1949).
'
5Jordan v. Brouwer, 86 Ohio App. 505, 511, 93 N.E.2d 49, 52 (1949) In an
especially well reasoned dissent, Judge Matthews emphasized that representations
on the label of the anti-freeze amounted to an express warranty to the ultimate con-
sumer, since the latter would be the only person likely to suffer by reason of the
falsity of the representations and the breach of warranty. See supra note 9.
' 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N.E.2d 8 (1953).
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facturer, and the plaintiff appealed on the ground that the court's charge
with respect to contributory negligence misled "the jury into believing
that contributory negligence would bar plaintiff's recovery not only on
the cause of action for negligence, but also on the cause of action for
breach of warranty. The court of appeals reversed on the ground that
the trial court did err in its general charge to the jury. On appeal, the
Ohio Supreme Court held that the trial court's charge did not mislead
the jury, and that even if it did, plaintiff had waived the error. The su-
preme court was not content, however, to rest its decision on this ground
alone. The court also looked into the breach of warranty aspect:
There is another reason why the charge of the court on contributory
negligence was not prejudical to the plaintiffs as it related to the subject
of implied warranty. The blanket in question was purchased in the original
package from an independent dealer. To support an implied warranty
there must be contractual privity between the seller and buyer. Although
a subpurchaser of an inherently dangerous article may recover from its
manufacturer for negligence, in the making and furnishing of the article,
causing harm to the subpurchaser or his property from a latent defect
therein, no action may be maintained against such manufacturer by such
subpurchaser for such harm, based upon implied warranty of fitness of the
article so purchased. Hence, there was no such privity and hence no im-
plied warranty upon the part of General Electric and no valid issue on that
subjecte
Although the holdings in the Jordan and Wood cases are not diffi-
cult to rationalize if the court refused to extend the strict liability of the
Ward doctrine to encompass a wider area, it is difficult to see why liabil-
ity should be determined by the type of damage which results. As a
matter of fact, the supreme court in the Wood case did not even mention
the distinction between personal injury and property damage- thus the
possibility that the Wood doctrine could be applied in the personal in-
jury cases. Another alarming feature of that case is that the court would
apparently limit recovery by the subpurchaser even for negligence to
situations involving inherently dangerous articles. This is manifestly
against the growing weight of authority, at least in the personal injury
cases.
III. Observations and Conclusions
"A breach of warranty gives rise to strict liability, which does not de-
pend upon any knowledge of defects on the part of the seller, or any
negligence."28 Perhaps it seems harsh to bring the manufacturer within
the orbit of this stringent rule, but modern social requirements and the
'Wood v. General Electric Co., 159 Ohio St. 273, 278, 112 N.E.2d 8, 11-12
(1953).
" PRossER, ToRTs 670 (1941).
1.9551
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
facts of modern economic practice would seem to require it in many
instances. Manufacturers advertise widely, creating a demand and in-
ducing the public to purchase their goods. The retailer is often a mere
conduit for the dissemination of these goods. The manufacturer con-
trols production methods and is, therefore, in the best position to insure
the safety or wholesomeness of products offered for sale. The consumer,
relying upon appearances of quality, has little or no opportunity for in-
spection and must take the goods as they come. Furthermore, as one
writer has said, there is " an increased feeling that social policy de-
mands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by defective chattels
be placed upon the producer, since he is best able to distribute the risk
to the general public by means of prices and insurance."29
From the point of view of the injured plaintiff, the imposition of a
strict liability on the manufacturer certainly seems desirable. The Ohio
courts, along with many other courts in the country,30 have given some
indication of placing themselves in the strict liability column so far as
food products are concerned.31 If a plaintiff has the right to recover
damages against the manufacturer without proof of negligence when his
food contains a needle, 2 should he not have a similar right when his per-
son is injured by a wire embedded in a piece of soap,83 or when his prop-
erty is damaged by an electric blanket bursting into flames?3 4  If the
plaintiff were able to prove negligence in these cases so as to come with-
in the scope of the MacPherson doctrine, there would be far less of a
problem. We have here, however, situations in which it would be ex-
tremely difficult to prove negligence 35 For one thing the doctrine of res
%psa loquitur is generally inapplicable because the instrumentality in
question is usually not under the defendant manufacturer's exclusive man-
agement and control."6
Id. at 689, citing Patterson, The Apportionment of Business Risks Through Legal
Devwes, 24 COL. L REV. 335, 357 (1924).
'See supra note 3.
' Apparently the Ohio courts do not draw a distinction between sales of food and
sales of other articles of personal property so far as actions against the retailer under
the Uniform Sales Act (OHIO REV. CODE § 1315.16-B) are concerned. See Dow
Drug Co. v. Nieman, 57 Ohio App. 190, 198-199, 13 N.E.2d 130, 134 (1936).
i'Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928).
'Kruper v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 113 N.E.2d 605 (Ohio App. 1953)
"Wood v. General Electric Co., 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N.E.2d 8 (1953).
'The argument that it is unjust to apply the warranty doctrine since the article in
question is ordinarily consumed in plaintiff's home and the manufacturer, therefore,
has no way of disputing plaintiff's evidence, is overcome by the difficulty which
plaintiff has in proving negligence and in refuting the manufacturer's evidence of
due care during production. Helms v. General Baking Co., 164 S.W.2d 150 (Mo.
App. 1942).




The practitioner should not overlook the possibility of a suit agantst
the manufacturer under the Pure Food Law.3 7 Dicta in the Kness and
Gauder cases correctly indicate that privity is irrelevant under that statute,
and, too, a federal court in Ohio has held that a distributor was guilty of
negligence per se under the statute.38 As we have seen, the rule is other-
wise if the suit be instituted under section 15 of the Uniform Sales Act.3 9
The distinction can be rationalized only on historical grounds, certainly
not in terms of social need.40
Other factors to be considered are the possibility and the practicality
of the injured consumer's proceeding against the retailer. In Ohio, the
latter is guilty of negligence per se if he violates the Pure Food Law.41
Whether this rule will be applied in cases of beverages containing dele-
terious substances remains an open question in Ohio.42
If the sale is of a product other than unwholesome food, or if there is
property damage rather than personal injury, the retailer's liability is not
so dear. There is strong dictum in McMurray v. Vaughn's Seed Store43
to the effect that when a dealer sells merchandise in the original package
as it comes from the manufacturer, there is no implied warranty, and that
the dealer is not liable for damages caused by any deleterious substance- in
such merchandise. The inplied warranties sections of the Uniform Sales
Act" were, however, not mentioned in that case, and subsequent cases
lead to the condusion that the retailer may be liable for breach of these
warranties even when he has no opportunity to inspect.45 Whether this
liability will extend to persons other than the immediate purchaser from
the retailer is still undecided m Ohio.46
"OHIo REV. CODE § 3715.21. No person shall sell, offer for sale, or have in his
possession with intent to sell, diseased, corrupted, adulterated, or unwholesome pro-
visions without making the condition thereof known to the buyer.
"Troetto v. G. H. Hammond Co., 110 F.2d 135 (6th Cit. 1940).
8OHIo REv. CoDe 5 1315.16.
' For further discussion of the problem as it arises under the Uniform Sales Act,
see 21 U. CIN. L REV. 460, 471 (1952) and Pelletier v. Dupont, 124 Me. 269,
128 Ad. 186 (1925).
'Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Hughes, 131 Ohio St. 501, 3 N.E.2d 415
(1936); Portage Markets Co. v. George, 111 Ohio St. 775, 146 N.E. 283 (1924);
Lovich v. The Salvation Army, Inc., 81 Ohio App. 317, 75 N.E.2d 459 (1947).
The retailer is liable even though the deleterious substance is in canned goods. Wolfe
v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 143 Ohio St. 643, 56 N.E.2d 230 (1944).
"21 U. CiN. L Ruv. 460, 464 (1952).
117 Ohio St. 236, 157 N.E. 567 (1927). In this case, manure containing soda
ash caused the dwarfing and killing of plaintiff's plants.
"OmIo REV. CODE § 1315.16.
"Gojatowska v. Fred W Alberecht Co., 17 Ohio L Abs. 294 (Ohio App. 1934),
iron nut in canned pork and beans; Dow Drug Co. v. Nieman, 57 Ohio App. 190,
13 N.E.2d 130 (1936), exploding agar which had been wrapped by manufacturer.
"For a discussion of this point, see 21 U. CIN. L. REV. 460, 469 (1952)
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There are situations, however, in which the injured consumer may be
unable either to prove negligence or to avail himself of his statutory
remedies against the retailer. And even if he were able to do one or the
other, he may prefer to proceed against the manufacturer for no other
reason than that the latter will be financially more responsible. Further-
more, it should be the policy of the law in this area to avoid a multi-
plicity of suits. By allowing the consumer to proceed directly against
the manufacturer, a suit by the retailer against the manufacturer would
be avoided.
A re-examination of the nature of the warranty doctrine itself will
perhaps dispel the argument that the privity requirement must necessarily
bar an action by one who has no contractual relations with the manufac-
turer. As was noted above,47 an action for breach of warranty was origi-
nally a tort action for breach of an assumed duty, and
it is by no means clear that it was anything more than the accident that
the cases which arose involved contracts that led to its being regarded as a
matter of contract at all. A return to the tort theory is still possible, if
the courts choose to find that the manufacturer has assumed a duty toward
those who use his product.'
The existence of middlemen, a modern economic necessity, should not
change substantive rights.4" Furthermore, in many other situations, in their
efforts to reach a just result in a given case, the courts have seemingly
treated negligence and warranty as substantially similar.50
It is not suggested that the manufacturer should be held liable to the
ultimate consumer in an instance when the product in question was not used
for the purposes intended, or when the injury was the result of some per-
sonal idiosyncrasy of the user.5' But whether the liability of the manu-
facturer is to be founded upon a strict liability in tort, upon a reliance theory
in contract, or upon legislative or judicial extension of the Pure Food and
Uniform Sales Acts must be worked out upon sound principles of law
and public policy.
MARY PHILLIPS AND FORREST A. NORMAN, JR.
'"Page 1.8PRossER, TORTS 690 (1941).
"42 HARv. L. REv. 414, 417 (1928)
' Even in the Ward case, the court talked of the presence of the needle as an evi-
dential fact from which negligence could be inferred. Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino,
27 Ohio App. 475, 485, 161 N.E. 557, 560 (1928) This is hardly the language
of warranty. See also the remarks of the court in Dow Drug Co. v. Nieman, 57
Ohio App. 190, 13 N.E.2d 130 (1936); and Jeanblanc, Manufactaurers' Liability to
Persons Other Than Thetr Immediate Vendees, 24 VA. L. REv. 134, 156 (1937).
By analogy, it may be noted that contributory negligence is still available in Ohio
as a defense in an action by a consumer against a retailer for violation of the Pure
Food Law. Leonardi v. The A. Habermann Provision Co., 143 Ohio St. 623, 56
N.E.2d 232 (1944)
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